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TOWARDS THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
IT IS GENERALLY accepted that the achievement of the
Millennium goal of halving the proportion of people
without access to safe drinking water by the year 2015 will
require not just more investment but also more efficient use
of that investment. One important piece of advice to
developing countries in this respect is to decentralise the
provision of RWS.
From the supply efficiency side, few scholars have
challenged the validity of the decentralisation approach.
Even those of who have raised doubts are of the view that
while the provision of infrastructure could be centralised,
maintenance should be decentralised because the local
governments have comparative advantages in terms of
information and incentive (Prud’homme, 1995).
The bias towards decentralisation in the RWS literature
could be due to the fact that hardly any empirical studies
relating to the comparative efficiency are available. Analy-
sis is based on individual case studies and subjective
assessments subject to the halo effect. The halo effect comes
when something, which is politically or socially desirable,
is also assumed to be economically efficient by the evalua-
tors in their subjective evaluations (Isham et al., 1995).
This paper looks at supply of safe drinking water in
India. In India the state and the local governments are
responsible for providing safe drinking water. Interna-
tional aid in the field of drinking water is a very small
proportion of total investment and so policy in this sector
has largely been autonomous.
The setting
Generally, small villages and remote habitats in India are
served by handpumps whereas larger villages, usually with
a compact population exceeding 2,000 are covered through
piped water schemes. The sample used in this study is part
of a larger study undertaken with support from the Univer-
sity of Strathclyde, Glasgow and is based on two stage
sampling method. List of villages with piped water supply
schemes were obtained from the state governments in
India. Unlike many developing countries, India has a
century old tradition of census and comparatively reliable
data. Resource constraints, however, permitted field visits
to only two states. Field visits to these two states revealed
that in two thirds of villages, piped water supply scheme
was functioning continuously for the last three years or
more. This yielded a fairly large sample of 1,708 function-
ing piped water schemes for which data was available.
The operation and maintenance of these rural piped
water supply schemes presents a mixed picture. In 459
villages, the water supply schemes are operated by the
agencies of the local government. In the remaining 1,249
villages, these schemes are operated by the agencies of the
state governments through centralised management in terms
of staffing, inventory control etc.
In general, NGOs have been in favour of decentralisa-
tion. The activist groups, however, hold the state govern-
ments responsible if there is an epidemic in an area even
where the provision of water supply is under the control of
the local authority. While the federal government has been
urging the states to go ahead with decentralisation, the
international aid agencies are even more insistent. The
German aid agency KfW withdrew the second stage of their
rural piped water supply project from the state of Madhya
Pradesh because decentralisation was incomplete.
On the other hand, the State Human Rights Commis-
sions often recommend that the maintenance and opera-
tion of drinking water schemes should be with agencies of
the state government. Safe drinking water has long been
recognised as a basic need (e.g., I.L.O., 1966). A consensus
seems to be emerging that the right to water should also be
regarded as a human right (Iyer, 2003). Some watchdogs
feel that the state government is better placed to safeguard
this human right as compared to a local authority (e.g.,
MPHRC, 1999).
Overall, the intuitively appealing idea of decentralisa-
tion is seems to be gaining ground.
Measurement of efficiency
Our empirical approach uses two alternative measures of
efficiency: (i) operating expense scaled by annual produc-
tion; and (ii) asset utilisation, which is annual production
of potable water divided by assets.
Inefficient inventory control and corrupt practices re-
flect high operating expenses. This first measure indicates
how effectively the operator controls its operating costs per
litre of water supplied. The second measure indicates how
effectively the assets are being used. Low productivity of
employees will lower asset utilisation.
An efficiently run RWS scheme can be expected to have
a low operating expense and a high asset utilisation.
The mean operating expense for decentralised RWS
schemes is 51.9 whereas that for centralised schemes is
46.9. This is depicted in figure 1. This 5.0 difference is
statistically significant at one per cent level. Looking at the
asset utilisation ratio, we find that for equal assets the
production by decentralised utilities (4.35) is less than that
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of centralised utilities (4.76). This is depicted in figure 2.
The 0.41 difference is statistically significant at 5 per cent
level.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation will show that for the
same level of water supply, decentralised schemes spend ten
percent more. Their asset utilisation is ten percent less than
that of centralised units.
The rough calculation described above ignores other
variables like geological variables, financing variables as
also the relative size and age of the individual WSS schemes.
To get more accurate results, a series of regression was run.
For want of space, tables of these results are not being
reproduced here. The results are available from the author
and will also be reported in the Journal of Development
Studies. We find robust results to the effect that centralised
RWS schemes are more efficient. It may be clarified that
‘centralised’ in our context means managed by state gov-
ernment, not federal government; whereas ‘decentralised’
means managed by the local village government.
Supply inefficiency of decentralisation
Admittedly, the losses on account of decentralisation are
small, but they are statistically significant. More important,
their signs go against the prevailing policy advice against
centralisation.
Economies of scale in terms of inventory control and
supervision may not be the only reason for increase effi-
ciency. Probably, the human factor is more important.
Even in developed countries, decentralisation may lead to
deterioration of prestigious institutions like Ingéniers des
Ponts et Chaussées of France without equivalent progress
in local government bureaucracies (Prud’homme, 1995).
In the developing counties, the technical skill of the local
bureaucracies is at a primary level.
There is enough evidence to believe that there is wide-
spread corruption in the provision of public services in
developing countries. Decentralisation of the provision of
public services can have the beneficial effect in terms of
decentralisation of corruption and consequent redistributive
effects. But there is also evidence that corruption is more
prevalent at a local level as compared to regional and
national levels. There are many reasons why this may be so.
Local politicians are likely to be more subject to pressure
demands from local interest groups. A major theoretical
advantage of decentralisation is more discretion at the local
level (Oates, 1972); but this discretion could be a source of
higher level of corruption.
At present political decentralization is much more ad-
vanced in India than the administrative decentralization.
Once administrative decentralization is complete, the local
bureaucrats will be under full control of the local politi-
cians. Managers working for the regional governments
move from place to place and have less unethical relation-
ships with the local politicians. The pressures of caste, tribe
and local politics are too strong even for a well-meaning
local government official. Location of public water stand
posts and handpumps is an example. The state govern-
ments have issued clear guidelines as to how these should
be located with a view to serve the disadvantaged sections
of the population. Often, the local level functionaries are
compelled to install the standposts and handpumps near
the influential households.
More important is the role of audit and the media.
Monitoring and auditing are better developed at the state
level. At the national and regional level, the media provide
information on political markets, exposing corrupt and
unethical politicians (World Bank, 2002, pp.181). Since
the media at the local level is underdeveloped, it is not in a
position to play a constructive role.
Corruption is very difficult to measure. Most of the
studies relating to ‘corruption perception’ analyse the effect
of corruption on business. Moreover, these studies com-
pare national governments and sub-national governments.
Relevant comparison would be within the category of ‘sub-
national’, i.e., regional and local governments. Studies in
Zaire and Tunisia, point towards higher levels of corrup-
tion in local governments (Prud’homme, 1992). Recently
studies in Uganda and the Philippines (Azfar et al., 2000)
points out the lack of accountability at the local level.
Corruption is bound to increase the cost of provision and
lower efficiency.
There is some evidence that community participation by
the beneficiaries in drinking water projects leads to better
project outcomes (Briscoe and de Ferranti, 1988; Isham
et al., 1995). The view that decentralization is a require-
ment for effective community participation and manage-
ment, however, is open to question. When social inequali-
ties supplement economic inequalities, the process of de-
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centralisation is political rather than participative and
liable to be captured by the local elite. It is nobody’s case to
minimise the participation of stakeholders. The point being
made is that decentralisation to a local government does
not necessarily increase community participation and man-
agement.
Political arguments in favour of decentralisation are
strong. Notwithstanding many outliers (e.g., communist
Yugoslavia was far more decentralised than France) demo-
cratic countries have more decentralisation. On the eco-
nomic side, it is true that richer countries are far more
decentralised than poor ones; but the causality is not
established.
In the water sector, the review articles (e.g., Gadgil,
1998) focus on technology and policy relating to tariffs etc.
It is usually taken for granted that a decentralised service is
more efficient. It is often assumed that the only reason
complete decentralisation has not taken place is that the
vested interests of the regional level politicians and techno-
crats are too strong. It is often assumed that the people want
decentralisation while the regional level governments op-
pose it. This view is open to question. There has never been
any referendum to determine what the people want. Para-
doxically, the decisions relating to decentralisation are
taken at the central level without consulting the people.
The only valid argument in favour of decentralisation,
rarely advanced, is that of learning by doing. Under the
guidance of the state governments and under pressure from
the people and the NGOs, the local governments are likely
to be more efficient, less corrupt and more responsible. This
would take time even if a carefully formulated strategy were
put in place. Another strategy could be to sidetrack centrali-
sation-decentralisation dichotomy, empower the people to
group together, form NGOs and engage in provision of
public services that the local governments may fail to
provide satisfactorily. In a multicultural multiethnic soci-
ety, it is a difficult task. Even strong votaries of decentrali-
sation have warned that we should not idealise village
community and that community ownership has lowered
the capacity of public authorities in India and other devel-
oping countries (Petrella, 2001, pp.15-16). In most devel-
oping countries no long-term viable strategy relating to
decentralisation with empowerment is in place. There is
only ham handed pressure from the metropolitan elite and
the donor community for decentralisation.
Conclusion
The millennium goal seeks to halve, by the year 2015, the
proportion of people without access to safe drinking water.
The jury is still out as to the level of government that is best
suited for achievement of the goal set.
Comparison between regional and local governments
needs to be studied further. The assumption that a govern-
ment that is ‘closer to the people’ will provide better
services is intuitively appealing but does not pass the test of
empirical analysis.
There may be sound political reasons for decentralisa-
tion; however the economic efficiency is doubtful at least in
the short and medium term.
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